On Mr. Walden Bello's "Globalization in Retreat"

To view Mr. Bello's full article from the Philippine Daily Inquirer, click here.
For a counterpoint from Sebastian Mallaby of the Washington Post, click here.

There is an honest sentiment among neo-marxist thinkers that globalization is a bid to further the ends of the global capitalist. The Communist Manifesto makes a clear and prophetic description of the way that capitalism will cross national borders and create the sort of world that we see today. It could be frighteningly prophetic, but it skips out on some major points that are transforming the world in a very different way. As a result, Mr. Bello's article fails to do justice to some of the finer (and I believe more relevant) points of what globalization is all about.

When Marx and Engels published their theories on historical materialism, they were operating from the premises of polarization between the bourgeosie and the proletariat within the context of institutionalized oppression, and of economic activity as the singular force that drove the progress of nations. They described a world of a global conflict, between the few bourgeousie owners and the mass proletariat. They saw a globalized world as a world of globalized industry. Communication, they argue, would serve as a catalyst between the scattered proletariat, to unify them in their struggle against the oppressors.

This entire thought is based on the assumption that turn-of the century industrial society (with its technology, philosophies, communication and culture), would continue unchanged. However, it didn't turn out that way. We are seeing a globalized world that is being driven by a lot more then just transnational industry. Information is not merely about coordination; it's about empowerment. People are using global information to expand their choices. People are taking advantage of the tools-- not in an effort to overthrow power structures-- but to become part of the power structures. A middle class, that Marx and Engels foresaw and dismissed as allies of the proletariat, are increasing and effectively neutralizing the polar conflict between proletariat and bourgeousie . Instead, the middle class are engaged in what I call mutual exploitation. They live satisfying lives by working, both for themselves and for their employers. For themselves in the sense that labour both gives them a place in society, and gives them an income that is liquid in the economy, constantly trading hands, paying for goods, services and information. The oppressed proletariat seeking liberation from the chains of the selfish industrialist is a thing of the global past. Instead, society is flattening at its own accord, finding an equilibrium in a larger middle class: some on top (like Donald Trump and the Texas oil barons), some on the bottom (slums in Mexico City and Southeast Asia) and a lot in the middle (you, me, everyone else who lives a 9-5 schedule, commutes to work, complains around the water station, reads Dilbert and has a life online). We're not the "bourgeousie" that Marx and Engels were whining about. We're just normal people.

Conceded, in developing countries, there is still a large number of people living in destitute situations, who are exploited, who are oppressed by regimes that still operate on feudal or industrial paradigms of thought. But put into a global context, the trend is towards moving the population curve to the middle of the income demographic. China, India, Singapore, Korea, Japan, Malaysia... all moving towards the middle, moving into the 21st century not on the backs of oppressed citizens, but on the efforts of unified, increasingly information-based economies.

Mr. Bello's point of a receding globalization is correct, if globalization is simply the action of a few institutions (IMF, WTO) with vested interests. But that is globalization 2.0 (Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat). Globalization 3.0 is what is happening today, and that is happening, not on the efforts of a few, but at the fingertips of the many, within the context of culture, not industry. The "nation-state" is still relevant today; but as the concept of "nation" is deconstructed, and the idea of "state" is superceded by regional institutions, the 17th century creation of the "nation-state" will no longer be as powerful or as persuasive. That's real globalization, and Marx and Engels never saw it coming.

-9th_wanderer

On Dawkins, Faith and Religion

The author of the book "The God Delusion", Richard Dawkins, makes an articulate and sharp-toothed case against the claims of religion, both as a basis of moral behaviour and the existence of God. Faith(belief in something contrary to evidence), argues Dawkins, provides the slippery slope into divisiveness, prejudice, and violence. Even though I am a Christian, I cannot deny this observation. History is littered with the evidence of how religion has worked against peace, tolerance and progress. Even today, the great "War on Terror" is at its heart, a religiously motivated conflict, a consequence of the battlelines drawn in the sand of Jerusalem between the Muslims and the Jews. In the heart of America, religious fundamentalism is also giving fuel to the actions of the right-wing politicians. On the documentary "The Root of All Evil?", Richard Dawkins confronted Ted Haggard, then pastor of the New Life Church. Haggard explained that the greatest issue facing the next generation will be the Islamification of Europe. *note: Haggard recently resigned as pastor of New Life because of allegations of sexual abuse and drug abuse.

Haggard doesn't think AIDS is a problem; he doesn't think climate change is an issue; Education in Third World countries doesn't get much merit either. The biggest problem is Islamification. From the point of view of an atheist, the whole religious conflict is really about two deluded parties arguing about who's delusion is better. And unfortunately, millions of people around the world buy into this pointless debate.

Furthermore, religous groups around the world are systematically engaged in, according to Dawkins' view, amounts to a Hitler Youth Camp-type indoctrination of children. In his essay, "Viruses of the Mind" he premises on the idea that children are programmed, by evolution, to be impressionable, and that religion takes advantage of this by setting up their false world view and teaching it as truth to the next generation of faithful, perpetuating the myths upon minds that havn't yet developed the capacity to think critically and weigh evidences.

Dawkins has a point about the consequences of religion. As the "faithful" categorically deny other perspectives as truth, assert their own beliefs as true, and perpetuate this absolutism, our society becomes polarized between religions. This has done the world no end of serious, bloody, and horrible conflict.

But what about Dawkins' arguments on the existence of God? His arguments are a highly articulate packaging of the same arguments atheists have used the world over: science, evolution, quantum theory, the lack of empirical evidence, cultural epidemiology. The case made with reason is overwhelmingly convincing.

But I believe, despite all the evidence and cuss me if you want, that God is out there and here. I don't have any reasons for why I believe that, but I do. And that's about as much as I have. It's enough for me. So what if its not enough for others?

I am not in the business of asserting my faith over others. That perspective is the slippery slope towards bombs on the tube, suicide bombers and restricting condom use in Africa. Trying to argue that my belief should be true for everyone else is the debate that leads to hatred and violence.

Faith is, on its own, nothing bad. For some, it's a delusion, for others, it's truth. However, what happens when a society begins to choose one truth over the other, and assert it without reason, without consideration, without acceptance, without critical thinking? That is where the danger lies. No one should dispute what you believe, but they can dispute how that belief is articulated and whether or not that belief should be the basis of how society will decide to act or how society should percieve one thing over the other.

-Quark

The Proving Ground of Communism

People in the Movement often point to Cuba as the shining example of communist theory gone right. There is an argument that because of the success of the Cuban system, it is undeniable that communism is not dead and can be successfully implemented, even in an increasingly capitalist/republican democracy world. They point to the cheap medicines, the success of socialist-oriented policy, and the survival of the Cuban economy in the face of American embargoes.

But I cannot say that I agree with the above statement. My first thought, when reading of the recent news of Castro's steady decline, was that the real test of Cuban communism is just around the corner. It must be understood that the success of the Cuban system can be attributed to one of either two things: the Communist system, or the leadership of Fidel Castro. Some might argue that it is a confluence of the two, that one would lead to another and vice-versa. Yes, I can agree with a point of view that states that these two factors are closely tied, but it doesn't do to simply argue chicken-egg on this point. One of these holds more importance then the other. And the question of "which one?" will be answered once one is removed. In the very near future, Fidel Castro will be replaced; even now, we see it in the increasingly present Raoul Castro. What will become of Cuba then? If the country can continue its isolation and practice of communist economic policies, then we can say with increased confidence that yes, Cuba's success was contingent upon its economic policies. However, what happens if it fails? It means that the system wasn't what really made the difference; rather it was the presence of an able and strong leader in the character of Fidel Castro.

Another problem with using Cuba as an example of success brought about by a politico-economic theory is that history has shown that economic success has no correlation between a system/theory and the actual state of the economy. In other words the system/theory of governance used in a country won't spell out success or failure for that country's economy. British monarchy in the 15th-19th centuries ruled the British Empire with absolute power. Not so much as God on earth as the British royalty in Buckingham or anywhere else in the world that was the British Empire. They didn't operate on free trade; they established ruthless monopolies, governed by the East India Trading Co. And they got rich, and until now, the exchange rate of the British pound in comparison to the Euro and USD is a testament of the success of that economy built by centuries of exploration, exploitation and monopoly. In Singapore, Lee Kuan Yu established an authoritarian regime. Today, they are one of the strongest economies in South East Asia. Last case in point is the dual success of two vastly different systems: India, with is free market federal system, and China, with its socialist party-dictated system. Both are experiencing rapid economic growth.

No matter what system is used, the success of a country is actually dependant on the people. You can't say that one system or political/economic theory is better then another. It all depends on how the people use a particular system to further the interests of their nation.

Communism? We'll see, but it's not as certain as the people in the Movement would like to believe.

-keep_traveling

Going Back to Meaning

Ludwig Wittgenstein wasn't really associated with post-modern thought. What he is known for are his philosophies on language and meaning, particularly the suspension of definition in favour of meaning.

What the heck is that supposed to mean?

Let's start simple-stupid. Language is made up of words. These words have certain meanings attached to them. These meanings are articulated in definitions, which are used to limit and clarify how those words are used to convey meaning.

For example, the word "hammer" is defined as a construction tool held in one hand used to drive nails into surfaces. But this is where it gets a bit gnarly. Any reasonably smart person can say that the word "hammer" can refer to a lot of different types of hammers: claw hammer, ball and peen hammer, mallet. A hammer can also be a part of the mechanism of a firearm, or it can be a small bone located inside a mammalian ear. What about a wrench used to drive nails for the lack of a proper hammer? Isn't that, according to the definition, also a "hammer"? If I said the word hammer to a guitarist, it means to tap an open string at a certain fret to change its pitch abruptly. "Hammer" isn't only a noun, its also a verb. It can mean to repeatedly strike something or subject something to sustained stress "The speaker was hammered by audience's questions."

What happened to the definition of "hammer"? It isn't really a "definition". In other words, the meaning isn't really limited, because it crosses the whole scale of literal, implied, physical and slang meanings. And that's with a relatively simple word. What about something as abstract as "democracy"? Or, even better still (but rather cliche) "love"? How do you limit the meanings of these words?

Okay, back-track a bit. Why do we even bother limiting words to definitions? Why should a word have an assigned "meaning" when in truth, its being used in so many different contexts? Language, as discussed by Michel Foucault, is an imposition of order and control. We need to define words so that there won't be any confusion when I say something. If I say "cat", it means a mammal with forward looking eyes, padded feet with retractable claws, a tail, and it purrs and has a rough tongue, and is very cuddly. I don't have to say all that; i just say "cat", and other people understand what i mean, because everyone understands its meanings.

Wittgenstein, in his earlier works, argued that the structuring of language, and its entire value, must be placed on these definitions. Everything, in order to have meaning, must be defined in order for it to be of value.

But, as we see above, language defies definition. The meaning of text changes from context to context, from speaker to speaker. This is precisely the problem with an idea such as "democracy". All the people who use it understand it in different terms: a multinational corporation, a populist movement, a local politician, college students, the media, interest groups, religious organizations, the military... all have different understandings of the concept of "democracy", and the board is littered with examples of how these different understandings clash with one another. How do we use democracy when the people using it have a collection of contradictory meanings associated to the term?

Okay, a logical solution is to find a common meaning that everyone can agree upon. But try simplifying the word "democracy" to something everyone can agree upon, and you end up with a definition that leaves so much to interpretation, opening the windows for reletavism and therefore, a deconstruction of your definition. However, if you narrow it down, you alienate and disregard other uses of the word which have just as much value and use as whatever narrow definition you create. At the end of the day, defining the word is meaningless.

Wittgenstein recognized this problem, and after spending half of his career arguing that definition was the core of linguistic value, he completely reversed himself by saying that the meaning of words were no longer in their definitions, but rather, in their use.

It is needless to define "hammer". All we have to know is how it is being used. If a musician is talking about guitar playing techniques and refers to "hammering the string" the value of the statement comes from its use.

I think this is a pretty simple point, but it has some very disturbing implications on our previous discussion on democracy. It means that the interpretation of democracy by the farmer has just as much legitimacy as the interpretation of democracy presented by a professor of political science.

Furthermore, doesn't this also mean that the depth of meaning, or the value of meaning, is contingent of the diversity of meanings associated to the word? A word with one meaning doesn't mean as much as a word with a lot of meanings. "Love" is so loaded with meaning that its use is so...darn...meaningful. In the discourse on democracy, we cannot simply impose one standard of what democracy is, rather we should seek out all the different meanings associated to it by all the people, and then use it in a particular fashion as to approximate the different meanings.

-the 9th Wanderer